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Policy and institutional quality are to a large extent endogenous. This statement reflects
the constraints to policy reform, constraints that can be a major impediment to changes
that are dearly needed to bring about better living standards for all people, but especially
the poor. To be sure, considerable debate remains regarding the details of which policies
are most likely to achieve these ends, as the recent protests in Seattle and Washington
attest. There is increasingly broad agreement, however, on good policies, e.g. that greater
prosperity is achieved by ensuring a stable and open macroeconomic environment, by
building accountable and inclusive public (legal, financial, political) institutions, and by
investing in health, education, and social safety net programs.' These programs, coupled
with rights to free speech and association, help to empower civil society organizations,
thereby giving greater voice to the interests and aspirations of marginalized groups.
The majority of politicians understand both intuitively and substantively what these good
policies (or "best practices") are, and most have the best of intentions with respect to
trying to bring about a better life for all in their country. But if this is so, why do too
many "good" politicians end up standing for, defending, or perpetuating policies that
undermnine  rather than advance general prosperity? In short, why are good politicians so
often associated with bad policies?
Before trying to provide a more formal explanation, let us begin with two examples of
good politicians and bad policies. The first comes from a developing country (which shall
remain anonymous, as it is a client of the World Bank) with a male illiteracy rate of about
40% and female illiteracy rate of 70%, placing it in the world's bottom 25% while the
country's GDP per capita is in the upper 25% of developing countries. The education
policy in this country is clearly "bad" despite a relatively high level of spending (6% of
GDP). This can be illustrated with a number of points:
a)  Teachers are not accountable and may show up or may not show up.  In particular
in the rural areas, teachers teach few hours.
This  is  the essence  of  the  Comprehensive  Development  Framework.
2b)  Many schools are closed between 12:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m. making it nearly
impossible for children who live often as far away as one hour walking distance to attend
both morning and afternoon sessions.
c)  The overhead is high; here may be at least one civil servant in the ministry of
education for each two teachers.
The Minister of Education in this country is a "good" politician, with the best of
intentions, a superior k,nowledge  of what is wrong with the education system, and what
good practice looks like. However, the Minister feels constrained in his/her efforts to
bring about change because of pressures from particular constituencies, like the civil
service and organized teachers.
The second example comes from higher education policies within the European Union.
With the exception of the four countries (UK, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden), the
financing of higher education in the rest of Europe is clearly regressive, diverting
resources away from the poor to the rich. These countries are clearly pursuing "bad"
policies. Like their developing country counterparts, the European ministers of education
are often fully aware of these flaws, and have the best intentions of changing it. But they
don't, or more accurately, can't because they fear the wrath of students and upper income
parents.
In this paper we seek to address the causes and consequences of constraints to policy
reform in developing countries. We argue that one of the primary reasons why otherwise
good politicians enact bad policies in countries all over the world, but especially in low-
income countries, is that they experience significant social constraints in their efforts to
bring about reform. These constraints--or what we here call "room for maneuver"-are
shaped by the degree of social cohesion within a country. Social cohesion and room for
maneuver determine the quality of institutions, which in turn have important impacts on
whether pro-poor development policies are devised and implemented.
A country's social cohesion is essential for generating the trust needed to implement
reforms. Inclusiveness of the country's communities can greatly help to build cohesion.
Citizens have to trust the government that the short-term losses that inevitably arise from
3reform will be more than offset by long-term gains. On the other hand, countries divided
along class and ethnic lines will place severe constraints on the attempts of even the
boldest, civic-minded, and well-informed politician (or interest group) seeking to bring
about policy reform. The strength of institutions itself may be, in part, determined by
social cohesion. We therefore propose that key development outcomes (the most widely
available being "economic growth") are more likely to be associated with countries that
are socially cohesive and hence governed by effective public institutions. We test this
hypothesis for a sample of countries. We are well aware of the limitations of a cross
country regression.  We will use the statistical tools as an instrument to find some degree
of order in a complex world.
Social cohesion should not be seen as primarily a developing or transition country
concern; indeed, too much is made of the distinction between "developed", "transitional"
and "developing" countries. Social cohesion, like the problem of order it seeks to flesh
out, is as important in the Ukraine as it is in the UK, in Canada as it is in Colombia, in the
Netherlands as it is in Nigeria.  The data set we use contains both developing and
developed countries.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section two we develop a conceptual framework based
on the idea of social cohesion. In section three we then review the data  which is
available to investigate this framnework.  Then we proceed in section four with our
statistical analysis. While several earlier studies have shown that differences in growth
rates among LDCs are the result of lack of democracy, weak rule of law, and the like, we
are more interested here in the social conditions that give rise to these institutional
deficiencies. Importantly, we are also concerned with establishing empirically a causal
sequence that goes from social divisions to weak institutions to slow growth. The essence
of our argument, supported by new econometric evidence presented here, is that pro-
development policies are comparatively rare in the developing world less because of the
moral fiber of politicians (though that surely matters) than that good politicians typically
lack the room-for-maneuver needed to make desired reforms. This lack of
maneuverability is a product of insufficient social cohesion and brings about weak
institutions. In section five we explore the determinants of social cohesion, focusing on
4historical accidents, initial conditions, natural resource endowments, but also ways to
foster social cohesion.  Section six presents a summary and implications for policy.
2. Social Cohesion  and Development:  A Conceptual  Framework
Social cohesion may provide one of the clues to development, though the expectation that
it might be the clue does injustice to the complexity of development. Moreover, social
cohesion may be no more than an analytical concept, helping us to organize our thinking
on the complex processes which lead to social or political choices which may serve better
short or long term development.
We prefer the term "social cohesion" above the widely used term "social capital" for a
number of reasons. First, we find the term 'capital' to be confusing when applied to
social issues because many of the characteristics of physical capital do not apply (e.g.,
divisibility, non-negative, and the possibility for establishing ownership).  Second, we
use the term social cohesion differently from social capital. There is a growing literature
emphasizing the "dark-side" of social capital (a good example is the possibility that more
local social capital leads to corruption or cronyism). Just as more physical capital is not
necessarily good for everyone, there is an optimal level of social capital. In the way we
define social cohesion, more is better.  Third, the term social capital has no inherent
ambition to be related to inclusion or responsive political institutions, while social
cohesion does so (in my use of the word). Fourth, as a former politician myself (* this
applies to first author), we want to use terms that policymakers and citizens alike
intuitively understand and are comfortable with.  We also want to refer to broader
features of society, whereas social capital is primarily concerned with networks and
communities. It is true that the term human capital does not satisfy the characteristics of
physical capital either, but at least one of the common elements about human and
physical capital-as  Glaeser (2000) rightly points out-is  that individuals decide on the
investments. With social capital it takes always two to tango; indeed, given the number of
people often involved in a network, social capital may be more of a square dance than a
5tango!  In the end, however, the use of a particular term over another matters far less than
that the issues they all encapsulate are brought to the table and seriously debated.
For this presentation, we define social cohesion in the following way:
Social cohesion is a state of affairs in which a group ofpeople  (delineated by a
geographical region, like a country) demonstrate an aptitude  for  collaboration that
produces a climate for change.
Presumably what some people would define as social capital-i.e.,  the norms, networks
and other related forms of social connection-will  be an important basis for this
aptitude.2 At the same time it will matter how, with whom, and on what terms these
norms, networks and other connections are made. Linking relations that connect people to
representatives of public institutions (such as the police, banks, and agricultural extension
agencies) are vitally important, as are bridging relations that connect individuals from
different socio-economic and demographic groups. Overwhelmingly, however, the poor
have few extensive linking or bridging ties, and are left instead to draw upon their
intensive bonding relations (family, friends, neighbors) to manage high levels of risk and
vulnerability (see Woolcock 2000; World Bank 2000).
In seeking to unpack this notion of social cohesion, let me stress from the outset that we
am fully aware of the fact that some political partisans with a narrow - even sectarian -
agenda have an unfortunate history of invoking social cohesion-type arguments as the
basis for their actions. The desire to cultivate a sense of national unity and "purity"
brought us the holocaust of ethnic cleansing, so we are most surely not arguing that social
cohesion equals cultural homogeneity or intolerance of diversity; quite the opposite. Nor
are we invoking some naYve  suggestion that socially cohesive societies are always
harmonious, or without political conflict. Rather, we use the concept of social cohesion to
make the point that - whether the entity concerned is a community, a corporation, or a
country - the extent to which those affected will work together when crisis strikes or
2 Other  contributions  to this field  have used  the term  social  capital  to denote  what in  this paper we call
social  cohesion.  Social  cohesion  is a more  appropriate  term for analyses  at the societal  level, since  social
capital  refers primarily  to norms  and  networks  residing  at the community  and  household  level.
6opportunity knocks is a key factor shaping performance. Graphic scenes on CNN during
the 1997 financial crisis in South Korea provided a fascinating case of social cohesion in
action, of people tearfully parting with family treasures in the belief that their humble
contribution was making a difference. Where this cohesion is lacking - as it was in
Indonesia - the response to crisis was far more sluggish, heightening a number of other
political tensions.  Dani Rodrik (1997) iaccurately  notes that crises of this sort are "not a
spectator sport - those on the sidelines also get splashed with mud from the field.
Ultimately the deepening of social fissures can harm all".
My reflections take as their point of departure missing clues in the mystery of
development. Consider the case of Ireland, for example, which emerged from being a
relatively poor OECD country to recently overtake the UK in GDP per capita.  The
explanations for this rise are quite solid: the Irish combined sound fiscal policy and a
strong human development policy, with a commitment to the rule of law and peaceful
labor relations in an open country environment (Barry, 1999). We need to look behind
these explanations, however, since they tell us nothing about how the Irish were able to
organize these good policies.  Conversely, consider Argentina, which fell from being one
of the world's richest countries in GDP per capita in 1920 to developing countries status
now, doing so largely because of its poor choice of economic policies.  We know in
general that good policies matter for devrelopment,  but we are still looking for clues as to
why good policies come about in one country but not in another.
Social cohesion may differ in conception in various countries and regions, but it is
equally important for every society.  Conceptions of social cohesion differ among the
OECD countries, and between OECD and less developed countries, in terms of the
themes and approaches given priority. In OECD countries, discussions about social
cohesion are driven by a concern to maintain an inclusive society able to withstand
external shocks and the harsh effects of a global economy. In the developing world,
social cohesion is discussed more in terms of reconstructing and developing a sense of
shared identity.  Encouraging effective rule-of-law (especially in post-conflict societies),
and developing a new set of formal institutions for managing exchange that complement
existing informal institutions, is a high priority.
7The framework  we use to understand  social cohesion  is depicted  in Figure 1. In this
framework  social  cohesion  is the driving  force for"room  for maneuver"  which  is in turn
needed  for political  reform,  but also  to further  the democratic  content  of the institutions
of the society. Social  cohesion  also  contributes  to an effective  rule of law and diminishes
the chance  for war or civil conflicts. And naturally,  there is the feedback  loop. Social
cohesion  will be strengthened  if, indeed,  the trust given  to empower  parties  to bring about
change,  does  result in growth  with a "reasonable"  distribution  over the different  groups  in
the population. This feedback  loop could  be one of the determining  forces  in
development  as a vicious,  or a virtuous  spiral.
8Figure 1: A Conceptual Framework for Understanding Social Cohesion
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3. Data on Social Cohesion, Institutions, and Growth
Emile Durkheim, one of the founders of'modern sociology, believed that if all members
of a society were anchored in a common set of symbolic representations - i.e. to common
values and assumptions about the world they live in - moral unity could be restored.
Without these moorings, he argued, any society, primitive or modem, was bound to
degenerate and decay, to be left unprotected against existential crises.  One can ask of
policymakers, political leaders and others who "celebrate diversity", whether there needs
to be "a common set of symbolic representations " or "common assumptions" (a set of
values and objectives that a society or community coalesces around) in order to bring
about the desired change. If indeed there is a set of values, or assumptions, what ought
they be?  Whose ought they be?  The questions become critical for development and for
9uprooting poverty during times of great social change (of the type commonly associated
with developing and transitional countries) and when broader, systemic transformation
undermines or challenges existing (familiar or traditional) systems of economic, social,
and political organization. These are among the questions that arise from the literature on
social cohesion and are implicit, too, in the World Bank's policy debate on development.
To grasp social cohesion one ought perhaps take a step back and look at social exclusion
and its four main causes. In its economic dimension, exclusion is first and foremost
linked to poverty. Although in some instances it may be the cause, in general it is
understood to be largely the result of poverty. The unemployed are typically excluded
from mainstream economic activity and are, therefore, denied access to property and
credit. In most of the developing world, especially Africa, long-term unemployment has
rendered many people unemployable. The second dimension is social: unemployment
does more than deprive one of an income, in most societies unemployment greatly
reduces one's status in society. This has been a particular concern in transitional
economies, where memories are still fresh regarding times of full employment, and where
exposure to global markets has exposed many painful differences in productivity and
living standards. Exclusion takes on a political (third) character when certain categories
of the population (women, ethnic, racial and religious groups, especially minorities) are
deprived of access to their rights, and/or when they can be blamed as the source of
problems being endured by the majority. A fourth dimension is identified as "non-
sustainable modes of development". This is explained as development that compromises
the survival of future generations (and which) excludes them from the benefits of
feasible, durable development.
There is a very short leap, conceptually, between social exclusion and social cohesion;
indeed they can be understood as two sides of a coin. However, addressing exclusion and
developing more cohesive societies is a task complicated by lack of coherence in the
understanding of what makes a country or a community cohesive, and when the
prevailing orthodoxy equates society with economy. The notion of exclusion raises the
point that there are often pockets of disaffected and/or marginalized groups within
society-which  can cause rupture and stand in the way of development or integration.
10For instance, whereas cohesive communities are able to identify problems, prepare
objectives, develop strategies to meet those objectives, and put them into action, distinct
pockets of cohesion may fracture and divide the community or broader society and
undermine the trust that is essential to collective action. Listening to the concerns of
isolated groups, and incorporating them into the broader vision of society, is an important
task for politicians.
The late Mancur Olson (2000) discusses how governments that have an "all-
encompassing" interest in society's prosperity and welfare will promote growth more
than governments that have a more narrow interest. He argues that a stable autocrat will
outperform an unstable autocrat, while a stable democratic government that will
outperform either form of autocracy. Best of all will be a democracy with checks and
balances, enforcement of the rule of law, and with clear rules of the game that prevent the
majority from excluding or expropriating a minority. Virtually all of the nations that are
rich today fall into this latter category. It's not too much of a stretch to see that social
cohesive societies will more likely generate governments that have an "all-encompassing
interest" in promoting growth.
Note that neither "stability" nor "democracy" alone is sufficient. An unstable democracy
poses the risk to investors and contracto:rs  that a short-sighted populist government will
come along, expropriating investments and breaking contracts. Stability with autocracy is
not enough, as Olson argues, because even the strongest dictators die and throw their
autocracies into succession crises sooner or later.
In the context of globalization, social cohesion enables us to recognize the continuous
process whereby individuals and groups are included or excluded from participation
within wider society. It can also refer to the measure of shared values, or to a willingness,
refusal or indifference to face common challenges in a society. These are influenced, in
turn, by any combination of a variety of factors such as, for example, ethnicity, culture,
religion, gender, education, class, physical disability and associations of choice.Along these lines we approach our definition of social cohesion as an aptitude.  One
encounters in the literature a great number of different measures, both direct and indirect.
Among the direct measures are:
Measures on memberships rates of organizations and participation in organizations:
Social relations have been measured in developing countries by Deepa Narayan and her
collaborators (e.g., Narayan and Pritchett, 1999), but mostly on a micro (community)
scale. At that level they are shown to be significant predictors of an aptitude for
cooperation. Robert Putnam's (1993) important work uses membership of organizations
as a measure of social cohesion (or more accurately, what he calls "social capital.") There
are sharp differences, however, between his assessment of the US and that of many
European countries, where indeed social cohesion went up as measured in this way. Is
this variance in "social cohesion"-as  measured by a richness of participatory processes
in organizations-related  to strong variance in social and economic policy reform? I do
not think so. Hence I question whether Putnam's measure is that relevant for social
cohesion as I have defined it. The results presented by Steve Knack (2000) seem to
support this. He finds that the trust variable does contribute to the explanation of
economic growth, but the membership of organization variable is not influencing growth
in a statistical significant way.  For reasons and because of the relative small available
sample, we will not use the membership variable.
- Measures on trust
A typical measure on trust (from the World Value Survey) is the aggregate of the answers
to the question "do you think people can be trusted?" for a random sample of
respondents.
There are cross-country measures of "trust" (see Knack and Keefer 1997). The new
surveys being conducted around the world, including OECD countries such as Australia
and members of the European Union, promise to yield significant new insights, and will
allow us to address these issues with much greater confidence. Work in the transition
economies is in its infancy, though some early promising work is starting to appear (e.g.
Rose, 1998).
12"Trust" is typically high in the richer countries (rates are around 50%) and low in
developing countries. Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries generally have
higher trust rates (between 15 and 35%) than Latin American (LA) countries (with rates
as low as 5% in Peru). Also Turkey is remarkable with a trust rate of only 10% in 1990
and 6.5% in 1995. African countries are in between CEE and LA countries in trust
levels, while Asian countries are in between developed world and CEE countries.  In
other words:
- Rich  countries
- Asia
trust higher  - CEE
- Africa
- LA and Turkey
Indirect measures are related to structural factors such as class and ethnicity inequalities,
which may undermine the capacity of different groups to work together, like:
- Income distribution measures (Gini coefficients and share of income to middle 60%):
The Gini coefficients has been used by l)ani Rodrik (1999) to address issues pertaining to
economic divisions in society. William Easterly (1999) seems to find that what he calls
the "middle class consensus" (i.e. a social inequality index that includes of the share of
income going to the middle 60% of the population) is a better measure. It is suggestive
(we don't establish causality here but Easterly 1999 addresses causality) that countries
with a middle class share above 50 percent  are rich economies  (see Figure 2).  While it
would be difficult to show that differences in middle class share are direct predictors of
enormous differences in aptitudes for change, a plausible case can be made that social
cohesive countries will ensure that rich and poor alike share in both the costs and benefits
of change, and thus enjoy greater prosperity than those more divided countries where the
benefits primarily go to the rich and the costs are borne by the poor.
Note that the simple correlation between the Gini coefficient and the "middle class
consensus" is high (0.88). But, still we have countries with a large middle class, but (for
rich countries) a large "Gini" inequality (e.g. U.S.), with the reverse of low "Gini"-
13inequality and a small middle class (e.g. Hungary) and of a large middle class and low
"Gini"-inequality (also for rich countries) (e.g. the Netherlands).
*  Ethnic heterogeneity ('ethnolinguistic fractionalization') measures. The most widely
used measure establishes the probability that two randomly selected individuals will
not belong to the same ethnilinguistic group. India scores high on this measure (89),
but so do, for example, Cote d'Ivoire (83) and Bolivia (63). Examples of countries
with low scores are Korea (0) and Japan or the Netherlands (1).
Table Ia gives an overview of the indicators used for social cohesion (Table la about
here). For 57 developing countries and 25 high-income countries we have data available
on the middle class share and on ethnic fractionalization. Data on trust is only available
for 34 countries (11 high income and 23 developing countries) for which also all the
other data is available.
The table also includes our measures on institutions and their summary statistics.
Institutions have been assessed by experts from very different organizations..
Table la
Social Indicators and growth
Mean  Standard  Number of  Range
Deviation  Observations
Ethnic fractionalization  39.63  29.29  82  0 -93
Middle class share  45.95  6.85  34  30 - 58
Gini  40.16  9.95  132  20.5 - 63.7
Trust  32.07  16.28  82  5 -64
GDP per capita, PPP  6112.90  5556.69  82  404 -20004
GDP per capita growth  2.07  1.67  82  -10 - 10
14Ethnolinguistic  fractionalization  index (measures  the
Ethnic fractionalization  probability  that two randomly  selected  persons  from a
given  country  will not belong  to the same
ethnolinguistic  group). Source:  Mauro,  initially  from
the Atlas  Narodov  Mira (Departnent  of Geodesy  and
Cartography  of the State  Geological  comnmittee  of the
USSR,  Moscow,  1964)  and Taylor  and Hudson  (World
Handbook  of Political  and Social  Indicators,  1972).
Middle  class  share  Share  of quintiles  2-4, average  1960-1996.
Gini  Average  of the period 1900-1996
Trust  Percentage  of respondents  in each  nation  replying  "most
people  can be trusted". Source:  World  Values  Survey.
GDP  per capita,  PPP  World  Development  Indicators.
GDP per capita  growth  Worldl  Development  Indicators.
Table lb
Institutional Indicators
Mean  Standard  Number of  Range
Deviation  Observaions
Voice and Accountability  0.352  0.92  82  -2.5 - 2.5*
Quality of the Bureaucracy  3.678  1.46  72  0 -6**
Civil Liberties  3.397  1.62  81  1 -7**
Property rights & rule-based govemance  3.232  0.82  56  1- 6****
Govemment Effectiveness  0.28t  0.94  78  -2.5 - 2.5*
Graft  0.2713  1.00  78  -2.5 - 2.5*
Law and Order Tradition  3.743  1.40  78  0-  6**
Political Instability and Violence  0.116  0.94  78  -2.6 - 2.5
Political rights  3.305  1.83  81  1 7***
Regulatory Burden  0.386  0.60  82  -2.5 - 2.5
Rule of Law  0.263  0.97  82  -2.5-  2.5*
*  2.5 represents best outcomes  **  6 represents lowest risk
***  I represents most free  *  6 represents best policy
15Source
Voice and Accountability
Quality of the Bureaucracy  Kaufinann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999a).
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), average
Civil Liberties  1984-1998.
Property rights and rule-based  Freedom House, average 1972-1998.
governance  Country Policy and Institution Assessment (CPIA), the
Government Effectiveness  World Bank 1998.
Graft  Kaufinann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999a).
Law and Order Tradition  Kaufmnann,  Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999a).
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), average
Political Instability and  1984-1998.
Violence  Kaufinann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999a).
Political rights
Regulatory Burden  Freedom House, average 1972-1998.
Rule of Law  Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999a.
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999a).
The quality of political institutions will clearly also be an important factor for
growth.  As the recent literature on corruption (e.g. La Porta et al, 1997) has shown,
arguments that corruption "greases the wheels" of growth simply do not stand up to
empirical scrutiny (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997). A central hypothesis emerging from our
social cohesion framework is that strong social cohesion makes it easier to improve the
quality of institutions..
4. New Evidence on Social Cohesion, Institutions and Economic Performance
The central story of economic growth over the last 50 years has been the contrast
between the years 1950-74 and 1975-2000. The former was a time of general prosperity,
in which all strategies yielded positive outcomes; rich and poor countries, open and
closed economies, temperate and tropical countries-everyone  did well. The twenty-year
period between 1974 and 1994, however, was disastrous for virtually everyone except the
16East Asian Tigers and India; the developing world suffered a twenty-year growth
collapse, from which it has only recently emerged (Figure 3).
Figure 3






While the causes of the global recession in the 1974-1994 are fairly well-known, it is
instructive to examine some of the differences between those countries that weathered the
storm, and those that did not. In his study of a large sample of developing countries,
Rodrik (1999) finds compelling evidence that weak public institutions and (ethnically)
divided societies responded worse to the shock than did those with high quality
institutions and united societies.
We find something similar here. We define as most cohesive those societies in the
lower half of ethnolinguistic fractionalization and in the upper half of share of the middle
class, and as least cohesive the reverse. We see that more cohesive societies have always
grown faster than less cohesive societies, but the difference only became pronounced
with the recession in the latter in the 1980s, with a tepid recovery that failed to close the
gap in the 1990s (figure 4).
17Figure 4: Index of per capita income  in least cohesive
and most cohesive  societies  (1960=1)
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(sample of 82 developing and developed countries)
By what mechanisms does social cohesion affect growth? Consider first the role of
institutions. Using a dataset compiled by Kaufinann, Kraay, and Zoido-Labatan 2000 it is
possible to assess whether high-quality institutions have been important for the LDC's.
Figure 5 suggests they have been, i.e. that higher quality institutions (measured here by
rule of law -- we will try many different measures in the next section) are positively
associated with higher average growth rates over the post-reform period.
18Figure 5: Rule of law and per capita  growth  1960-98
(moving  median of 30 observations  ordered by rule of law)
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Quality  institutions  themselves  reflect  the nature  and extent  of social divisions,  as we will
develop  more formally  in the next section. Figure 6 shows  that, indeed, high quality
institutions  are associated  with lower levels  of inequality  in developing  countries. Here
inequality  as a proxy for social divisions  is measured  by the share  of the middle  class. If
we would  have chosen instead  of the middle  class,  the Gini coefficient,  a similar result
would  have emerged.
19Figure 6: Share of the middle class and rule of law
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Together, these suggestive empirical results show that building social cohesion - through
the construction and maintenance of high-quality institutions pursuing the common good,
and through the lowering of economic (and other) divisions - has been, and remains, a
vital task for countries wrestling with development.
20Figure  7:  Ethnolingustic  fractionalization  and
rule  of law
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Ethnic divisions make it difficult-although  not impossible, as we will see below-to
develop the social cohesion necessary to build good institutions.  Figure 7 confirms that
more fractionalized societies have worse rule of law. 3
We are left then with two determinants of social cohesion and thus good institutions -
initial inequality and ethnolinguistic fractionalization. We predict that societies with a
lower initial inequality as proxied by a larger share for the middle class larger share for
the middle class and more linguistic homogeneity have more social cohesion and thus
better institutions, and that these better institutions lead in turn to higher growth.  In a
sensitivity analysis we also include the Gini coefficient and the trust variable.
3 Alesina  and La Ferrara  2000 found  that one  measure  of instititutions  "trust"  was negatively  related  to
ethnic  diversity.
21These predictions are confirmed in the Appendix, where we use the different proxies for
"good institutions" of Table lb.  Table 2 gives an example of four measures of
institutions which show a highly significant pattern of voice and accountability, civil
liberties, government effectiveness and graft, with signs indicating more social cohesion
leading to better institutions.  Table 3 gives an overview of the more and the less
significant relations.  All of our measures of institutional quality are positively associated
with growth (as was shown by Kaufmnann,  Kassy and Zoido-Loboton (KKZ) 1999 for
their measures of institutions). Here, we have used three stage least squares to take into
account the possible endogeneity of institutions - our two indicators of social cohesion
make natural instruments that allow us to identify a causal link from good institutions to
growth.  Interestingly the two measures of the International Country Risk Guide seem to
be less reliable, within this framework, than the other measures. Also, the CPIA index of
the World Bank is less reliable, which should not surprise as the standard deviation is
small (see Table lb).
Thus our findings support the two-stage hypothesis we outlined at the beginning -- that
more social cohesion leads to better institutions and that better institutions lead to higher
growth. This is true regardless of how we measure institutions.
In Table 4 a typical example is given of the sensitivity analysis for trust, group
membership and the Gini coefficients for the institutional variable "voice and
accountability".  {Table 4 about here).  This example is part of the pattern: all sensitivity
analyses show the following:
*  The Gini coefficient and the middle class share are separate dimensions of social
cohesion.  Including the Gini coefficient hardly reduces the significance of the effect
of the middle class share on institutions, while the effect of the Gini coefficient itself
is highly significant.
22*  Trust (strongly) interacts with ethnic fractionalization and the middle class share.  In
countries with high  levels of trust ethnic fractionalization is less important for the
quality of institutions.  Also the size of the middle class becomes less important.
Table 4
Statistics of Regressions on Voice and Accountability with trust, participation and the
Gini-coefficient
N  C(1)  C(3)  C(3)  C(3")  C(3")
constant  ethnic  middle  trust  Gini
class
8 1  -3.24  -3.54  4.83  -
34  -2.27  -1.47  2.23  1.93  -
82  -3.60  -2.72  4.76  - -2.60
When comparing the predictions for growth rates using the "Voice and accountability"
variable for institutions, a distinct regional pattern is visible.  Almost all East Asian
countries in the sample (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Sri
Lanka and Thailand) have growth rates between 1.3% (Sri Lanka) and 4.5% (Singapore)
larger than predicted.  Only the Philippines remains below the predictions (with -1.1%).
Many Latin American countries in the sample on the other hand remain substantially
below the predictions (Bolivia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Nicaragua and Venezuela with
between 1.3% and 2.4%).
The same is true with many of the African countries (Benin, Chad, Ghana, Niger,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Zambia, South Africa, with a distance of between -1.2
and -2.7%).  Botswana (4.2%), Gabon (1.7%), Lesotho (2%) and Uganda (1.4%) have
substantial positive differences.
23Also, for many European countries, the predictions exceed actuals, notably for
Switzerland (-1.3%) and the UK (-1.1%). This is also the case for the US (-1.2% and
New Zealand (-1.8%).
In contrast, some North African countries (Tunisia (2.0%) and Egypt (2.1%) as well as
Turkey (1.5%) do better than predicted.
Table 5 gives the general picture for all 11 measures of institutions.  This is a remarkable
finding: in some areas of the world growth rates are decidedly higher or lower than in
other areas with the same institutions and cohesive forces. The general picture is that:
*  In Asia predicted growth falls short of actual growth;
*  In rich countries and LA predicted growth exceeds actual growth;
*  In Africa the pattern is mixed.
How to interpret this "regional" component? Non linearities or other intervening
variables may be the reason.
5.  Social Cohesion: Origins and Development:
If social cohesion is so important, how can it be nurtured?  While social cohesion is
partly shaped by national leaders, social cohesion also depends n some exogenous
historical accidents. A nation-state that has developed a common language among its
citizens is more cohesive than one that is linguistically fragmented. This is not to say that
linguistic homogeneity is bad or good - all nations started out as very diverse
linguistically. Linguistic homogeneity may simply be an indicator of how much a group
of nationals have developed a common identity over the decades or centuries that
national identity forms.  Where such a common identity is lacking, opportunistic
politicians can and do exploit ethnic differences to build up a power base.  It only takes
one such opportunistic politician to exacerbate division, because once one ethnic group is
politically mobilized along ethnic lines, other groups will.
This should not be interpreted in a pessimistic light - that nations where there are large
cleavages of class and language are condemned to poor institutions and low growth.  Of
course, nations should not embark on forcible redistribution and mandatory linguistic
24assimilation.  These results only say that on average lack of "exogenous" social cohesion
has been exploited by politicians to undernine  institutions, which in turn has resulted in
low growth. But politicians can choose to build good institutions, unify fractionalized
peoples, and defeat the average tendency to divide and rule.  In fact where institutions are
sufficiently well developed, there is no adverse effect of ethnolinguistic diversity on
growth. The corollary is that good institutions are most necessary and beneficial where
there are ethnolinguistic divisions. Formal institutions substitute for the "social glue" that
is in shorter supply when there are ethno'linguistic  divisions (Easterly 2000).4
The other determinant of social cohesion is whether the historical legacy is one of relative
equality or of a vast chasm between elites and masses.  Engerman and Sokoloff (1997)
describe how inequality in Latin America arose out of factor endowments and historical
accidents.  The tropical land in Latin America was well-suited for large scale enterprises
like silver mines and sugar plantations, worked by slaves or peons.  The benefits of these
operations largely accrued to the small criollo class. The elite was kept small by
restrictions on immigration from Iberia or elsewhere to the Iberian colonies. The labor
force had to be forcibly recruited through the import of African-American slaves and the
encomienda system that tied the indigenous people to the elite's land.
In Canada and in the North of the US, by contrast, the factor endowments were
conducive to small-scale production of food grains. A middle class of family farners
developed. Practically unrestricted immigration and abundant available land (once the
tragic process of despoiling the native inhabitants was completed) swelled the size of the
middle class. Immigrants voluntarily assimilated to (and contributed to) the dominant
middle class culture. The American South was a kind of intermediate case between North
and South America, with a mixture of free family farmers, elite slaveowners, and
African-American slaves. 5
4 The notion  of (ethno)linguistic  fractionalization  definitely  begs operations  on social  cohesion  within  the
European  Union. Extra institutional  efforts  are required  to ovecome  this disadvante  of different  languages.
5 For an application of this general argument to understanding growth collapses in LDCs, see Woolcock,
Pritchett, and Isham (1999).
25Heyneman (1998) identifies three ways in which education contributes to social cohesion.
First, it helps provide public knowledge about social contracts among individuals and
between individuals and the state.  Second, education helps provide the behavior
expected under social contracts, "in part through the socially heterogeneous experiences
students have in the schools themselves".  Third, education helps provide an
understanding of the expected consequences for breaking social contracts.  As he puts it,
social cohesion "constitutes a new challenge for the economics of education".
The basic purpose of public schooling from the beginning has been to establish a
cohesive, peaceful and, hence, profitable society".  An important implication of this is
that measuring human capital simply in terms of "years of schooling" may be missing a
vitally important component, namely, that the quality of education matters as much - if
not more - than quantity.  If social cohesion matters for the well-being of all societies, it
becomes necessary to ask, who, or what is the vehicle for creating, or engendering it? The
literature places the burden before governments and most arguments converge on
education as the key.
Given the vital role the state has in shaping the context and climate within which civil
society is organized, it can, in some cases, also actively help to create social cohesion-
this  is one of the conclusions of the forthcoming World Development Report (World
Bank 2000).
26Table 2
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27'Iable 5
Region  Distance  between  Actual and Predctfed GDP  Per  cavita Growth  (Predictioni  based  on Institutions Measures)
Voice and  Quality of the  Civil  Property rights &  Government  Graft  Law &  Political  Political  Regulatory  Rule of  Confidence  in
Accounta-  Bureaucracy  Liberties  rule-based  Effective-ness  Order  Instability &  rights  Burden  Law  Parliament
bility  governance  Tradition  Violence
East  Asia  Mean  3.21  2.68  3.28  3.15  2.60  2.75  2.60  2.64  3.18  2.64  2.51  3.04
Sid. Dev.  0.96  0.94  1.45  0.82  0.90  0.93  1.07  1.01  1.34  1.10  0.84
Obs  7  7  6  4  7  7  7  7  6  7  7  1
South  Asia  Mean  0.61  0.86  0.65  0.63  1.40  1.20  1.47  1.53  0.33  1.10  0.80
Std. Dev.  1.02  0.54  0.90  0.74  0.38  0.35  0.53  0.92  0.89  0.82  0.86
Obs  4  3  4  4  3  3  3  3  4  4  4  0
Pacific  Mean  -1.37  -1.15  -1.22  -1.53  -1.26  -1.27  -1.17  -1.39  -1.16  -1.67  -1.23  0.53
Std. Dev.  0.40  1.11  0.75  . 0.65  0.93  1.02  0.61  0.64  0.78  0.77
Obs  3  3  3  1  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  1
North  Africa  Mean  1.01  0.85  1.08  -0.17  0.67  0.68  0.82  0.94  1.01  0.89  0.56  -0.59
and Middle
East
Std. Dev.  0.68  0.78  0.54  0.69  0.56  0.56  0.56  0.58  0.74  0.83  0.61
Obs  9  9  9  6  9  9  9  9  9  9  9  1
Subsahara  Mean  -0.32  -0.78  -0.18  -0.33  -0.31  -0.46  -0.74  -0.39  -0.09  0.30  -0.43  -2.20
Africa,
Std.  Dev.  1.77  1.94  1.71  1.72  1.98  1.83  1.86  1.83  1.67  1.69  1.70  1.07
Obs  22  16  22  22  20  20  16  20  22  22  22  2
Europe  Mean  -0.53  -0.51  -0.46  -0.60  -0.55  -0.49  -0.57  -0.46  -0.64  -0.45  0.08
Std.  Dev.  0.80  0.91  0.80  0.91  0.94  0.85  0.87  0.81  0.81  0.89  0.95
Obs  15  14  15  0  15  15  14  15  15  15  15  11
North  America Mean  1.01  0.85  1.08  -0.17  0.67  0.68  0.82  0.94  1.01  0.89  0.56  -0.59
Std.  Dev.  0.68  0.78  0.54  0.69  0.56  0.56  0.56  0.58  0.74  0.83  0.61
Obs  9  9  9  6  9  9  9  9  9  9  9  1
Middle  and  Mean  -0.61  -0.13  -0.71  -0.27  -0.34  -0.24  -0.24  -0.44  -0.72  -0.97  -0.17  0.05
South  America
Std. Dev.  1.05  0.84  1.04  1.28  0.97  0.96  0.93  1.06  1.11  1.18  0.89  1.28
Obs  20  18  20  19  19  19  18  19  20  20  20  156. Conclusion
Let us conclude  by pulling  together  some  of the strands  of this paper. On the preceding
pages  we have drawn  attention  to several  points.  The first of these is the need for a deeper
consideration  of, and a more focused  research  agenda  into,  the cohesiveness  of societies
and the quality  of public institutions,  and their relationship  to sustained  growth.  We need
to know a lot more about  how equitable  and fairly to manage  the costs and benefits
associated  with the transformation  of society,  especially  how to foster a greater sense of
cooperation  and inclusion  in environments  where there  is division  and hatred. This is an
issue for all countries  -- developing,  transition,  and developed.  Building  social cohesion
matters as much in Uganda  and Ukraine  as it does in Sweden  or Slovenia.
While  these problems  are enormously  challenging,  I think we can be greatly encouraged
by the recognition  that our definitions  and conceptions  of development  have evolved
quite dramatically  in recent years.  The accomplishments  and recent  traumas  in East and
South East Asia, the difficulties  of building  market institutions  in former  planned
economies,  and major conferences  such as the UN Summit  on Social  Development,  have
shown us  just how important  it is to invest in the human  and social dimensions  of
development.  Healthy,  educated  people  are not only more  productive  workers,  they are
also better  parents,  better  neighbors,  and better citizens.  It is our hope that recent  events
have also taught  us the importance  of being  more humble-though no less committed-
in our approach  to poverty  reduction,  of listening  more and  talking less.
Taking stock  of the historical  record also reveals  that even  when it is done well,
development  is inherently  fraught  with controversy,  that rising  prosperity  necessarily
alters  the balance  of power  in society.  As the social historian  Theda  Skocpol  notes,
revolutions are more likely to occur when conditions are improving, not deteriorating.
This means that we must pay special  attention  to designing  policies  and projects  that
protect  the most vulnerable  members  of society.  Joe Stiglitz  (1998)  observes  that
development  "represents  a transformatio:n  of society,  a movement  from traditional
relations,  traditional  ways of thinking,  traditional  ways  of dealing  with health  and
education,  traditional  methods  of production,  to more modem  ways." Adopting  and
29adapting these "more modem ways" is no easy task. Among other things, it requires
credible local leaders who are able to articulate the interests and aspirations of the people,
to identify a set of objectives and ideals around which those can coalesce. It requires a
genuine sense of ownership and responsibility on the part of all stakeholders, and a
commitment to work together.
There is the paradox of the increasing scale and scope of our global economic affairs in
simultaneity with the reawakening of our sensitivities towards local issues and identities.
An important feature of this paradox is that its resolution depends on overcoming two
corresponding trends militating against it, namely increasing inequality (Pritchett, 1997)
and increasing volatility. The technology that makes life more stimulating, cosmopolitan,
and prosperous for some is making it more precarious and uncertain for many others.
Managing the risks and rewards of globalization is thus the key policy challenge of our
time. Doing so effectively and responsibly will entail giving renewed attention to social
safety nets protecting the most vulnerable members of society. It will entail building
more responsive and accountable public institutions that can anticipate problems, and
make swift adjustments. It will entail encouraging leadership across all levels of
society-from  soccer coaches and classroom teachers to business executives and heads of
state-to  build bridges across the widening social and economic divides.
An inclusive economy and society requires a serious commitment to building and
maintaining social cohesion. It matters in all countries and for all members of society,
especially the poor, and their prospects of living with a sense of empowerment, security,
and opportunity. We hope you will join us at the World Bank in helping to make that
dream a reality.
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33Appendix
3SLS regressions  for social  cohesion,  institutions,  and growth,  using different  measures  of
institutions
Equation 1: Institutions=C(l)+C(2)*Ethnolinguistic  Fractionalization+C(3)*Middle  Class Share
Equation  2: GDPPCGR  = C(4)  + C(5)*Institutions
C(1)  C(2)  C(3)  C(4)  C(5)  l
Institutions  measure  Con-  Coef-  Coef-  Con-  Coef-  Number  of observations
stant in  ficient  ficient  stant in  ficient
first  of insti- of insti- second  of
equation tutions  tutions  equation growth
on  on  on insti-
ethnic  middle  tutions
fraction- class
alization share
Voice and  Coefficient  -1.963  -0.010  0.059  1.654  1.171  81
Accountability
(KKZ)
t-Statistic  -3.242  -3.537  4.827  8.192  4.668
Quality  of the  Coefficient  -1.795  -0.008  0.126  0.027  0.574  71
Bureaucracy
(ICRG)
t-Statistic  -1.819  -1.720  6.368  0.047  3.956 ___





t-Statistic  7.076  3.944  -4.936  8.477  -4.600 




t-Statistic  4.328  -1.406  0.243  4.286  5.185
Government  Coefficient  -2.576  -0.009  0.070  1.848  0.896  77
Effectiveness
(KKZ)
t-Statistic  -4.244  -3.183  5.756  9.770  4.002
34Graft (KKZ)  Coefficient  -3.2051 -0.009  0.084  1.901  0.763  77
t-Statistic  -5.155|  -3.119  6.690  10.296  3.791
I
Table 2: 3SLS  regressions  for social  cohesion,  institutions,  and growth,  using different  measures  of
institutions  _
Equation  1: Institutions  =C(1)+C(2)*Ethnolinguistic  Fractionalization+C(3)*Middle  Class Share
Equation  2: GDPPCGR= C(4)+C(5)*Institutions
I  C(1)  (C(2)  C(3)  C(4)  C(5)
Institutions  measure  Con-  C'oef-  Coef-  Con-  Coef-  Number of observations
stant  in  ficient  ficient  stant  in  ficient
first  of insti- of insti- second  of
equation thtions  tutions  equation growth
on  on  on insti-
ethnic  middle  tutions
fraction- class
alization  share
Law and Order  Coefficient  -1.462  -0.009  0.121  -0.110  0.598  71
Tradition
(ICRG)
t-Statistic  -1.606  -2.166  6.659  -0.186  3.993
Political  Coefficient  -2.537  -0.009  0.066  1.994  1.004  77
Instability  and
Violence  (KKZ)
t-Statistic  -4.051  -3.165  5.217  11.074  4.118





t-Statistic  6.046  3.905  -4.411  8.827  -4.505
Regulatory  Coefficient  -0.258  -0.007  0.020  1.286  2.012  81
Burden (KKZ)
t-Statistic  -0.576  -3.229  2.207  5.491  4.933
Rule of Law  Coefficient  -3.106  -0.007  0.080  1.892  0.704  81
(KKZ)  _
t-Statistic  -4.971  -2.594  6.340  11.391  3.6391_
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